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ABSTRACT 
This study was conducted in support of a Department of Defense (DOD) effort to 
improve cyber-security in relation to DOD installation control systems. Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) is developing programs to assist decision-making 
for the selection of cyber-security products for U.S. naval installations and infrastructure. 
We interviewed a sample of Naval Facilities Engineering Command employees utilizing 
the Value-Focused Thinking technique developed by Dr. Ralph Keeney in the 1990s. The 
interviews revealed various means objectives and fundamental objectives that we compiled 
into a network. The network organizes values into means and fundamental objectives and 
also helps to clarify terminology often used within cyber-security communities. Our goal 
is for, through organization and the clarification of terms, this study to serve as an initial 
step to the identification of objective performance measurements, which can inform the 
decision making-process.  
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A. PROJECT CONTEXT 
Top naval commanders have acknowledged the need to increase cybersecurity for 
their control system networks and to reduce vulnerabilities to cyber threats in the future 
(Lyngaas, 2016). Space and Naval Warfare Systems (SPAWAR) Center Pacific’s Resilient 
Critical Infrastructures through Secure and Efficient Microgrids (ReCIst) project is 
developing a tool to help Naval Facility and Engineering Command (NAVFAC) energy 
management teams measure the return on investment (ROI) of cybersecurity investments 
to protect their energy control systems (Lyngaas, 2016; Romero-Mariona, 2016). ReCIst is 
leading an effort to help NAVFAC energy management teams make the best cybersecurity 
decision for their installation’s infrastructure (Romero-Mariona, 2016), defined as adding 
the most value to the stakeholders. This thesis is designed to aid the ReCIst team in the 
development of their return-on-investment (ROI) tool by determining and defining what 
impacts of cybersecurity investments are important to stakeholders and therefore should be 
included in the ROI measure. 
B. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM AND WHOM DOES IT AFFECT? 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is taking steps to make its energy systems more 
efficient and resilient by investing in and developing microgrids (Broekhoven, Judson, 
Galvin, & Marqusee, 2013; Nekoui, 2014) and other control systems at its installations. A 
microgrid is a stand-alone network that “can be islanded from the local utility grid and 
function in stand-alone mode” (Broekhoven et al., 2013, p.41). A microgrid has the ability 
to supply power to consumers independent of the commercial grid, sometimes with the use 
of alternative sources of energy such as solar and other fuels (Broekhoven et al., 2013). 
Microgrids have the potential to secure the energy supply in times of natural disaster or 
commercial power outages (Lantero, 2014; Ortiz, 2015). Microgrids require a network of 
computerized control systems (CS) in order to function and allow energy managers to 
monitor activity (Broekhoven et al., 2013). Control systems are networks of computer 
software and hardware used to control and monitor infrastructure functions such as 
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electrical voltage from the commercial grid to the microgrids, sewage, and building 
functions such as air conditioning (Nekoui, 2014). 
The network of control systems raises concerns over the vulnerability to cyber 
threats (Broekhoven et al., 2013). The ReCIst team states, control systems and their 
“microgrids can increase the potential cyberattack surface by offering new entry points that 
could be used to target larger Smart Grids and ultimately compromise critical 
infrastructures” (Romero-Mariona, 2016, p.3). Previous research has provided numerous 
examples where hackers infiltrated control system networks, disrupted energy capabilities, 
and stole data (Adametz, Groesbeck, & Quibilan, 2016). A recent example is the 
compromise of customer credit card information from the retail company Target in 2014 
(Adametz et al., 2016). Recently, Equifax and nearly half of the U.S. population fell victim 
to a cyberattack through a weakness in an online support tool. Also, in October 2017, a 
U.S. cybersecurity company reported “hackers linked to North Korea recently targeted U.S. 
electric power companies with spearphishing emails” (Mitchell & Dilanian, 2017). There 
is a considerable cybersecurity threat that will not fade or retreat on its own (Wattles & 
Larson, 2017). 
The Navy has taken steps to invest resources to research, develop, and purchase 
cybersecurity products across all naval functions (Keller, 2017). Investing implies 
stakeholders will receive some sort of measurable return on their asset in the future, but it 
is very difficult to precisely measure that return or guarantee 100% security for connected 
networks (Hubbard & Seiersen, 2016). 
The ReCIst team and this thesis project attempt to tackle this challenge and bridge 
the gap between business measures and operational considerations for Navy installation 
energy systems (Romero-Mariona, 2016; Romero-Mariona et al., 2017). This thesis project 
seeks to inject stakeholder input into the SPAWAR ReCIst ROI tool. Stakeholder input is 
important to properly develop a tool that reflects the legitimate concerns of those who 
routinely design, operate, and use control systems. NAVFAC energy management teams 
will ultimately use the ROI tool to make decisions on cybersecurity investments for these 
systems. The users of the tool will input information about their specific control system 
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and select information on cybersecurity products they would like to add, and the tool will 
measure the ROI for that product. 
C. PROJECT GOALS 
This project’s purpose is to assist the SPAWAR ReCIst team with developing the 
ROI tool by collecting important end user inputs. While the SPAWAR ReCIst team has 
developed the capability for the model to represent an end user’s system, one of the 
important remaining issues is how to measure ROI as a function of the performance of the 
system. Our goals, based on the SPAWAR ReCIst team’s needs, are as follows: 
• Identify and clearly define stakeholder values for control system 
cybersecurity. 
• Produce understandable and usable information for the ReCIst team. 
D. PROJECT SCOPE AND APPROACH 
1. Scope 
This project focuses on the eventual end users of the ReCIst ROI tool—engineers 
and managers in various roles at Naval Facilities and Engineering Command (NAVFAC)-
run installations. While the tool may be useful to a broader set of end users, NAVFAC 
engineers and managers are the target audience, and are the focus of the development effort. 
NAVFAC engineers’ and managers’ decisions affect a much broader group of 
stakeholders. The stakeholders are also their customers and the NAVFAC end users have 
internalized stakeholders’ values with respect to NAVFAC industrial systems, which our 
results confirm. 
2. Approach 
The methodology is based on value-focused thinking (VFT), which uses 
stakeholder values to support the best possible decisions in many contexts (Keeney, 1996). 
Stakeholder values were identified in qualitative interviews. The interviews were 
conducted with potential end users of the tool such as energy managers and subject matter 
experts. The data is synthesized into a means-ends objective network (Keeney, 1996) 
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which offers a perspective on the values and trade-offs that should be captured in the 
ReCIst ROI tool, how characteristics of cybersecurity products contribute value, as well as 
specific objectives that the ReCIST team can seek to measure. 
E. SUMMARY 
Cyberattacks are a concern to the U.S. Navy energy infrastructure because it has 
the potential to inhibit successful military missions and operations. The Navy is striving to 
protect their infrastructure by investing in cybersecurity, but measuring the financial return 
on those investments is difficult. The SPAWAR ReCIst team is attempting to make 
quantifying cybersecurity ROI easier by developing a tool for NAVFAC energy 
management teams. Our project’s objectives are to support the SPAWAR ReCIst team by 
determining stakeholder values and mapping them to measurable impacts. In Chapter II, 
we discuss background information on naval micogrids, control system networks, cyber 
threats, and ROI. In Chapter III, we discuss the methodology behind VFT and our research. 
In Chapter IV, the results of the VFT-interviews are revealed in the form of means and 
fundamental objectives. We provide the analysis of what the results mean for our project 
in Chapter V, and in Chapter VI, we provide project conclusions. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Starting with the rising connectivity of automated systems and the corresponding 
prevalence of cyber threats, and response at multiple levels of the U.S. federal government, 
this chapter illustrates the purpose of the ReCIST ROI tool. In addition, it describes the 
research approach and the reasons for choosing it in this context. 
A. WHAT ARE MICROGRIDS AND CONTROL SYSTEM NETWORKS? 
The world, including the DOD, increasingly relies on automated systems that are 
linked to intranet and Internet devices. In 2001, the number of devices connected to the 
Internet was around 400 million (Department of Energy [DOE], 2017c). Less than 15 years 
later, that number was estimated to have grown to 25 billion in 2015 (DOE, 2017c). Control 
systems (CSs) are quickly modernizing as part of this trend. While there are many reasons 
for this trend, the efficient and reliable functioning of energy systems is a key contributor. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) is seeking to improve the resiliency, reliability, security, 
affordability, flexibility, and sustainability of the United States’ electrical grid through the 
Grid Modernization Initiative (DOE, 2017a). A major element of GMI is the 
implementation of Smart Grids, which drastically increase a power grid’s reliability, 
resiliency, and efficiency (DOE, 2017b). Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA), also known as control systems, are critical for the smart grid implementation.  
Modern control systems are used across industrial organizations to transmit real 
time data and controls, which assist an organization’s ability to respond efficiently 
(Inductive Automation, 2017). Advances in control systems have changed reactive 
monitoring to proactively identifying developing situations and solving problems before 
they inhibit operations or safety (Clouser, 2013). Control room operators are no longer just 
monitoring, they now have the ability to control industrial machinery through dispatching 
based on need rather than arbitrary schedules (Clouser, 2013). The ability to proactively 
solve issues and make decisions in order to prevent problems adds to the overall efficiency 
of an organization through its efficient use of manpower (Clouser, 2013). Ultimately, 
 6 
modern control systems allow fewer people to control more assets and do so more 
efficiently (Clouser, 2013). 
Microgrids are local power grid systems that can operate with autonomy by 
unplugging from commercial grid systems (Lantero, 2014). Although many microgrids 
operate concurrently with the commercial grids, the capability of the system to function 
independently is beneficial because it can provide power during times when the 
commercial grid is unable to provide power (Lantero, 2014). This benefit was 
demonstrated in 2012 during Hurricane Sandy (John, 2012). While entire commercial grids 
were shut down, pockets of installations maintained their own power (John, 2012). 
Although the key aspect is the ability to operate independently, microgrids provide much 
more than just backup power. Another important aspect of microgrids is in the efficient use 
of power and the translation into cost savings (Lantero, 2014). A microgrid’s use of 
alternative fuels lessens the reliance on a commercial grid’s power distribution (Lantero, 
2014).  
B. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE CYBER THREAT? 
Cyber threats have risen alongside the rise of the online systems and the reliance 
on control systems. Cyberattacks are becoming more sophisticated, militarized, and 
targeted. The number of data breaches in the first six months of 2017 has increased by 
164% compared to all of 2016 (Graham, 2017).  
Interoperability between control systems is increasing and therefore the 
possibilities for cyberattacks expand (Idaho National Laboratory, 2016). Russia, Iran, and 
China, along with non-state actors such as hacker groups and terrorist organizations, are 
continuing to seek methods to disrupt the U.S. energy grid through cyberattacks (Idaho 
National Laboratory, 2016). The utilities responsible for implementing security measures 
often lack a full-spectrum perspective of their cyber vulnerabilities (Idaho National 
Laboratory, 2016). North Korea is also becoming a more serious cybersecurity threat. As 
recently as October 10, 2017, FireEye, a private cybersecurity company, reported that 
North Korea had launched phishing emails in an attempted breach of U.S. electrical 
companies.  
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Based on its assessment of vulnerabilities in the energy grid infrastructure, the DOE 
judges that Russia and China pose the greatest threat with regards to capability and intent 
of cyberattack (Idaho National Laboratory, 2016). In 2009, Russia and China were 
involved in the infiltration and attempted mapping of the U.S. energy grid, and even went 
as far as to leave behind malicious programs aimed to disrupt power distribution (Gorman, 
2009). In 2015, Ukraine was hit by a cyberattack that completely shut off the power for 
250,000 citizens and left the power systems to be operated manually for months. The 
coordinated attack is largely suspected to have been conducted or financed by the Russian 
government and is believed to be a precursor to future attacks on the U.S. electrical 
infrastructure (Zetter, 2016). 
C. WHAT IS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY’S CONCERN? 
The importance of uninterrupted electrical power cannot be understated. The U.S. 
government, economy, and citizens rely on electrical power in every facet of life. 
Commerce, transportation, health and emergency services, communications, and national 
defense are dependent on reliable uninterrupted power (Center for Naval Analysis Military 
Advisory Board, 2015). Even short outages can be detrimental to the nation or region 
affected. In 2012, Superstorm Sandy caused widespread outages across the northeastern 
United States. The communication systems used by emergency services were dependent 
on commercial power and when the back-up generators stopped providing power, the 
ability of recovery crews to respond diminished (Center for Naval Analysis Military 
Advisory Board, 2015). 
The DOD is the largest electrical consumer in the United States and an estimated 
91% of the DOD’s critical infrastructure is reliant on the commercial grid (DOE, 2017c). 
In 2013, the Department of the Navy (DON), via the Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
established the Energy Systems Technology and Evaluation Program (ESTEP). The goal 
of ESTEP is to “focus on energy technologies that reduce costs, increase energy security, 
and ultimately increase the reach and persistence of the warfighter” (DON, 2015). ESTEP 
implements its research goals through the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
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Command (SPAWAR), and other organizations (Asia-Pacific Technology and Education 
Partnership, 2017). According to the APTEP website, ESTEP funds research for 
educational purposes though NPS; installation construction, operations, and maintenance 
purposes though NAVFAC; and energy network operations and security purposes though 
SPAWAR (Asia-Pacific Technology and Education Partnership, 2017).  
D. WHAT IS THE ReCIst ROI TOOL? 
SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific’s (SSC Pacific) Resilient Critical Infrastructures 
through Secure and Efficient Microgrids (ReCIst) project is part of ESTEP. The ReCIst 
team is developing a return-on-investment (ROI) tool to assist decision-making on what 
cybersecurity measures fit particular installation circumstances. It will build on the team’s 
earlier work, specifically, the Cyber-SCADA Evaluation Capability (C-SEC; Nekoui, 
2014). C-SEC is a program under SPAWAR that focuses on energy system security with 
the goal of improving the overall protection of control systems (Nekoui, 2014). The ROI 
model will eventually be implemented as a third part of the ReCIst program. According to 
team members at SPAWAR, the ReCIst program will be comprised of three sections. These 
will include the ROI tool, a derivative of the C-SEC program that measures the 
functionality of cybersecurity products, and the energy efficiency of the control system. 
Like traditional ROI tools, the objective is to analyze the costs and benefits of an 
investment, and provide capability for evaluating and comparing multiple investment 
options (Investopedia, 2003). Using the system model in the C-SEC, the ROI tool is 
intended to evaluate the performance of the system with the addition of a cybersecurity 
project under consideration. The ReCIst team aims to capture—and quantify—the cost 
savings provided by security measures due to cyberattack identification and prevention. 
The tool will utilize inputs that consider the cost of potential cyberattacks and the cost of 
implementing a particular security product or measure. According to the team, the tool will 
provide a quantifiable monetary analysis that will better assist in the decisions over which 
security measures to implement. 
 
 9 
E. WHO ARE THE STAKEHOLDERS? 
The potential users for the ROI tool are those who would utilize it in order to make 
decisions on the security of their NAVFAC installation. Specifically, primary stakeholders 
are energy installation managers, control system engineers, utilities managers, and others 
who have direct involvement or responsibility to the security of the networks.  
The group of stakeholders is much broader. The potential damage caused by 
cyberattacks on military installations’ electrical power would negatively affect the DOD’s 
ability to carry out its mission, thus anyone involved in that mission or depending on that 
mission is a stakeholder. One of the key goals within the mission of the DOD is to “protect 
the security of our country” (DOD, 2017). Any degradation of that protection would 
negatively affect the citizens and other residents. 
F. WHAT IS A RETURN ON INVESTMENT? 
ROI tools are commonly used in financial decisions to evaluate the forecasted 
impact of different investments. The ROI metric can be applied to anything that has a cost 
with the potential to produce gains (Calculator.net, n.d.). The fundamental ROI formula is 
displayed in Equation (1). Note that the formula assumes that both cost and gains are 
summarized in a unidimensional measurement scale and, moreover, that they use the same 
scale, i.e., the same units—usually monetary. Because control systems and cybersecurity 
provide many different types of benefits, and many types of costs, a fundamental challenge 
to calculating an ROI is summarizing multidimensional benefits (and costs) in a single 
scale. The return-on-investment tool that SPAWAR is developing aims to measure benefits 
of security measures in the form of cost savings, or in equivalent monetary value. Unlike 
most financial investments where the “gain on investment” would be referred to as profit, 
the SPAWAR ROI tool will attempt to quantify cost savings of attack prevention, while 
capturing any other benefits or costs that are important to the stakeholders.  
 Gain on investment - Cost of investment
Cost of investment
ROI =   (1) 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
To support SPAWAR’s ReCIst ROI tool and per this project’s goals in Chapter I, 
section C., the team used the value-focused thinking (VFT) methodology (Keeney, 1996) 
to identify what NAVFAC energy management teams value from their control system 
networks and from protection in the form of security products for control systems. In 
particular, the team elicited values and objectives from stakeholders in structured 
interviews, explicitly defined the objectives, and organized them into a means-ends 
network, identifying the fundamental (also known as “ends”) objectives and showing the 
relationships among objectives. 
A. WHY USE VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING? 
Keeney (1996) states that decision problems are not necessarily “problems,” but 
decision opportunities. In SPAWAR’s ROI tool, the decision opportunity is which cyber 
product(s) do I buy to protect my control system and microgrid? The VFT method 
identifies values that stakeholders might not have otherwise considered. Our team hopes 
that VFT will reveal additional values previously not thought of by analysts and decision 
makers. The focus on end objectives and values will eventually lead to a better decision 
and a better ROI tool. 
VFT also clarify values and provide structure for measuring costs and benefits. 
Doing so will eliminate redundant objectives and explicitly define values so that they may 
be measured. For example, clarifying and standardizing the term resilience—if you define 
it as “time until power is restored,” you have something that’s at least potentially 
measurable. If metrics are not standardized the effects and expectations of the cybersecurity 
products will be different across the DOD. 
Another important contribution of VFT, in the SPAWAR ROI context, is clarifying 
and communicating (for example, Figure 4) why various metrics are important. This can 
allow one to not measure a seemingly important objective if you can measure higher level 
objectives instead. For example, in a manufacturing plant, if you measure the production 
objectives between “maximize quantity of units produced” and “minimize total costs,” it 
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may become unnecessary to track the amount of material used to produce the units. Of 
course, this example depends on the level of management. VFT can also help stakeholders 
with competing objectives—for example, trade-offs between a “more secure” control 
system versus a “more functional” control system. VFT aims to identify how various 
stakeholder preferences interact with other legitimate but conflicting preferences.  
Keeney’s VFT separates itself from other decision-making methodologies by 
teasing out previously unknown or unthought-of alternatives (Keeney, 1996). Decision 
makers often only compare and make decisions based on a limited selection of alternatives. 
While these alternatives will probably solve their problem, they do not necessarily offer 
the best outcome (Keeney, 1996). For example, you may choose between three restaurants 
to eat lunch due to proximity, even though you are willing to drive further if there were a 
better option. In the future, you will tend to decide lunch options between only those three 
restaurant menus. Keeney addresses this issue by having the stakeholder identify the 
values, or “what they care about,” in relation to the decision opportunity (Keeney, 1996). 
The identified values stimulate additional alternatives and eventually lead to a better 
outcome (Keeney, 1996). For example, assume you performed VFT and you value low-
sodium and vegan options, and after a little research, these values led you to find four more 
restaurants in reasonable proximity that meet these preferred nutritional values. You would 
then have better, but previously unthought-of, lunch options for the future.  
Alternatives intended to be revealed through VFT methodology are already going 
to be represented in SPAWAR’s ROI tool as various cybersecurity products. SPAWAR 
and the DON may have the opportunity to identify and select products they would not have 
otherwise identified as a result of this method. The products will be an output of the ROI 
tool, but not identified while using the tool or while doing VFT.  
B. DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS 
The VFT methodology has five basic steps as depicted in Figure 1: identify 
stakeholders, determine values, convert values to objectives, distinguish between means 
and ends objectives, and construct the means-ends objective network (Keeney, 1996; 
Maitland, Barclay, & Kweku-Muata, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the VFT methodology 
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using various values, related objectives, and ultimately means-ends networks. For example, 
the value “not need car” translates to an objective “have necessary goods and services 
nearby.” The figure illustrates the same process using several other projects as guides to 
execute the first five VFT methodology steps. 
 
Figure 1.  Value-Focused Thinking Process. Adapted from Keeney (1996), 
Maitland et al. (2013), and Siebert (2013). 
1. Identify Stakeholders 
Values “should come from individuals interested in and knowledgeable about [the] 
situation” (Keeney, 1996; Maitland et al., 2013). For this project, the stakeholders were 
NAVFAC energy managers, engineers, and program managers, as detailed in Table 1. The 
stakeholders were contacted and recruited in accordance with NPS Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) human subjects research guidance.  
We obtained subjects by first identifying which commands operationally supported 
the energy mission and worked with control systems. The NAVFAC website has its 
organization easily delineated by function and location, and has contact information. We 
also decided to select commands in relatively close proximity to the NPS. We also made 
selections based on news articles. For example, NAVFAC Miramar was selected to be 
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contacted based on an online news article about its innovative renewable energy microgrid 
construction plan. 
Table 1.   Interview Locations 
Date Location Interviews 
14 Sep 17 NAVFAC, Miramar 3 
15 Sep 17 NAVFAC, NBSD 2 
18 Sep 17 NAVFAV, JBPHH 1 
19 Sep 17 NAVFAV, JBPHH 1 
20 Sep 17 NAVFAV, JBPHH 2 
 
2. Identify Values 
Researchers probe the stakeholders with questions and have open discussions to 
identify their values in context to the decision problem (Keeney, 1996). In this project, the 
team conducted structured interviews with the identified stakeholders. The following list 
represents a menu of questions that could have been asked in any given interview to 
identify values. These questions were created based on previous research in Maitland et al. 
(2013) and a literature review on cybersecurity concerns, microgrids, and control systems. 
Due to time constraints (the interviews were limited to approximately one hour) we 
averaged three menu questions, 1, 2, and 3. We selected these questions due to the volume 
and variation of answers they might invite. Stakeholder answers were written on a Post-It 
note and placed on a wall or white board with elaboration in response to interviewer 
questions, and with their relationships identified as described in steps 3 and 4 of Figure 1,  
1. List what is important to you regarding the performance of CS networks. 
2. Describe the ideal performance of a microgrid under a cyberattack (or 
electrical grid if no microgrid). 
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3. List the consequences of a worst-case scenario (within reason). 
4. List what is important to you regarding cybersecurity performance for CS 
networks. 
5. What are your current concerns relating to security threats on CS 
networks?  
6. What can be done to raise awareness of cybersecurity threats on CS 
networks? (Maitland et al., 2013) 
7. What are some of the issues that prevent the effectiveness of CS 
networks? (Maitland et al., 2013) 
8. How would you evaluate cybersecurity threats on CS networks?  
9. How would you evaluate your vulnerability to cyber threats? 
10. What would you tell other energy engineers to do to maintain 
cybersecurity, CS networking performance?  
11. What can the owners of commercial-run power plants do to increase safety 
against cybersecurity threats? 
3. Restating Values as Objectives 
The third step in the process is to restate the values as objectives using a verb-noun 
format (Keeney, 1996; Siebert, 2013). Keeney (1996) explains, “An objective is a 
statement of something someone desires to achieve” (p. 34). 
Steps 2, 3, and 4 were sometimes conducted simultaneously and produced raw data, 
as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Converting the interview answers into objective statements 
would prove to be one of the simplest of all the steps. Most of the time this was done while 
the questioning was taking place. These figures show the answers written on yellow post-
it notes placed on a white board. The subsequent writing with accompanying arrows are a 
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result of “why is that important?” and “what do you mean by that?” questioning per Step 4. 
Each interview’s raw data was recorded with a picture and compiled to complete Step 5. 
 
Figure 2.  Example of Interview Results 1 
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Figure 3.  Example of Interview Results 2 
4. Delineate Means and Fundamental Objectives 
Keeney (1996) says, “A fundamental objective characterizes an essential reason for 
interest in a decision situation” (p. 34). Means objectives lead to the accomplishment of 
fundamental objectives (Keeney, 1996). Step 4 is accomplished by asking the “why is that 
important?” question, which leads to fundamental values or the “what do you mean by 
that?” question, which could lead to more detailed means objectives (Keeney, 1996; 
Maitland et al., 2013). For example, a frequently written answer to the question “List the 
consequences of a disaster” was death or casualties as a result of an electrical surge or 
breaker trip. After questioning, the interviewee clarified the value to “minimize casualties.” 
When asked, “why is that important?” the interviewee explained that while casualties may 
prevent NAVFAC from accomplishing its mission, casualties were important even absent 
an effect on the mission, revealing that minimizing casualties is a fundamental objective. 
As Maitland et al. (2013) noted, “If an objective is found to be important because it helps 
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achieve another objective, it is categorized as a means objective; otherwise it is a 
fundamental objective” (p. 7). After several interviews it was clear that “minimize 
causalities” was a fundamental objective. The “what do you mean by that?” question also 
helped clarify industry buzzwords like “resilient.” For example, almost all interviewees 
valued “maximize resiliency.” Interviewees defined resiliency as the amount of time to 
return to normal operation, or the minimum amount of time it took to restore power. This 
helped to clarify that resiliency is not the same as durability or flexibility. Flexibility is 
preventative and resiliency is reactionary to a specific event such as an unplanned outage. 
This clarification greatly simplifies the identification of appropriate measures of resiliency 
that may be included in ROI calculations. 
Due to time constraints, Step 4 was also performed after the interviews. A difficult 
aspect of this step is knowing when to expand upon vague objective statements. “Maximize 
efficiency” is an example of an objective given by interviewees that is not well defined, or 
not defined identically by all. Efficiency is a ratio used to measure relationships between 
specified numerators and denominators (for example, “production efficiency” is a common 
ratio used in a manufacturing plant). The numerator in this ratio is total costs and the 
denominator quantity of products produced, with the goal to minimize costs and maximize 
the quantity of products manufactured—to produce more products with less material and 
costs. In our case, “efficiency” was often described as the relationship between performing 
the best quality services while striving for lower costs. “Services” was defined as 
supporting the effort to deliver constant power to the customer and other base functions. 
“Maximize efficiency” would eventually break out into two or more fundamental 
objectives such as “maximize reliability,” “maximize resilience,” and “minimize costs.”  
5. Means-Ends Network 
Step 5 is to structure objectives into a means-ends objective network (Keeney, 
1996; Maitland et al., 2013). Three main aspects to the network include identifying the 
highest-level fundamental objectives, relationships among objectives, and the size and 
scope of the network (Keeney, 1996). The means-ends network is a graphic depiction of 
all of the interview answers and is presented in Chapter IV. The means-ends network 
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represents a formula shell where performance metrics could be developed reflecting each 
node (objective) in the network. Means objectives contribute to fundamental objectives 
(i.e., fundamental objective measurements could be calculated as a function of the means 
objectives). 
The means-ends network also helps identify the relationships between competing 
objectives, such as more cybersecurity versus system functionality—where additional steps 
to improve the security of the control system may restrict its maximum potential to 
function. The potential to lose functionality of the control system as a result of adding 
security measures was a constant theme expressed throughout the interviews.  
Ideally, preference trade-offs are evaluated using fundamental objectives (Keeney, 
2002). In our case, the trade-offs between security and system functionality should be 
evaluated between the effects of the fundamental objectives identified in Chapter IV. For 
example, based on Keeney (2002), an appropriate question to elicit fundamental value 
trade-offs in this context would be: Suppose it costs $1 billion annually to maintain 50% 
cybersecurity, and suppose it costs $6 billion annually to obtain 60% cybersecurity. Is a 
10% gain in cybersecurity worth an additional $5 billion annually? This is distinct from 
asking: Is it worth $1M to have a kill switch? The ReCIst ROI tool could calculate 
relationships between the means and fundamental objectives; for example, the relationship 
between “enable kill switch” (means) and “maximize resilience” (ends). 
 20 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 21 
IV. RESULTS 
From the interviews, we were able to consolidate fundamental and means 
objectives into a network illustrated in Figure 4. The fundamental objectives were common 
to all interviews, and are arranged in a hierarchy (each lower-level objective has only one 
parent) at the top of Figure 4. here was one overarching objective that all subjects agreed 
was paramount: The ability to provide mission support to end users of their services. This 
objective is shown in the top left of Figure 4. Various means objectives were discussed 
with certain subjects emphasizing differing aspects of those characteristics. Not every 
means objective was raised in every interview. Means objectives, are shown in a network 
(each means objective may contribute to more than one higher-level objective) in the lower 
portion of Figure 4. This chapter explains each fundamental and means objective and how 
it contributes to the ability of NAVFAC to support end users.  
 
Figure 4.  Means-Ends Objective Network 
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A. FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
Based on the interviews, the most common responses led to four fundamental 
objectives: to maximize reliability, maximize reputation, minimize costs, and minimize 
casualties. Combined, these fundamental objectives led to one overarching objective: 
maximize installation support. For each NAVFAC entity, maximization of installation 
support was meant to allow end users the best possible energy support needed to 
accomplish their mission. 
1. Maximize Reliability 
Universally, according to all those who participated in the study, reliable energy 
was an essential value and a crucial aspect of the mission. Depending on which level the 
subjects worked at and the specificity of the NAVFAC facility mission, “reliable energy” 
was defined by the subjects differently. However, the term was consistently used to refer 
“to the ability of an energy production system to provide consistent and expected levels of 
energy under stated conditions for a specified period of time” (Energy-101.org, 2017). 
Objectives like minimizing outages, maximizing regulation compliance, maximizing 
resilience, and maximizing flexibility of the control systems were all mentioned within the 
interviews as important means to the maximization of reliability. By minimizing the 
number of outages occurring, the system is naturally able to provide more consistent and 
therefore reliable energy. A facility department’s ability to comply with regulation ensures 
that there will be no government interference in regards to the system’s operation and 
therefore supply of power. Resilience ensures that the system is able to recover and is 
therefore more reliable under stress. Flexibility adds to reliability as the system’s ability to 
adjust and respond to differing circumstances helps to provide optimal service. In relation 
to sustaining the ability to provide reliable energy, the subjects had differing outlooks as it 
pertained to cybersecurity. An energy installation manager explained that while 
cybersecurity is important, there are immediate issues when it comes to providing adequate 
manpower to support the systems. In regards to his manpower concerns, this subject 
explained more thoroughly that he felt it more probable that they could potentially have a 
system that nobody knew how to use and that was more threatening than the current cyber 
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vulnerabilities. Contrary to that opinion, a subject that oversaw a more extensive network 
expressed concerns over the potential cyberattacks could have in disrupting the reliable 
energy. This subject felt that there was a realistic hacking threat that could allow adversarial 
control over electrical breakers. 
2. Maximize Reputation 
The ability to provide reliable energy was directly related to the fundamental 
objective to maximize reputation. Subjects felt that the ability to provide low cost, reliable 
energy helps to bolster the facility’s reputation. Across all installations involved in the 
study, the subjects expressed a general concern for NAVFAC’s reputation. Much like 
public and private companies, a federal agency’s reputation is of great importance. Public 
trust is a fundamental component that is necessary for the success of government actions 
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], 2017). One of the 
ways to build a good reputation is to improve the ability of an organization to meet 
expectations (Eccles, Newquist, & Schatz, 2007). The DOD is expected to protect 
American security (DOD, 2017). The DON’s ability to protect their control systems is part 
of that mission. A disruption to a CS that degrades the ability of the Navy to function in 
turn degrades the expectation that the DOD can keep America safe. As Benjamin Franklin 
is quoted, “It takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad one to 
lose it” (Goodreads, n.d.). 
3. Minimize Costs 
Costs are what is paid or given up in order to get or achieve something. This study 
defines costs as an expenditure of resources or opportunity. Resources include labor, 
materials, time, and monetary funds. In the context of the control systems, the resources 
would be manpower, physical assets, time, and budgetary discretion. 
Costs were discussed in all forms in every interview that we conducted. The control 
system’s ability to minimize labor requirements was one of the most prominent means 
objective related to keeping costs low. With more automated functions and less time taken 
to fix or perform maintenance, the control systems are able to save resources. This also 
helps to minimize planned or unplanned outages. Planned outages may occur as the result 
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of regular maintenance or as system updates are installed. Unplanned outages occur for 
various reasons such as weather disruptions, breaker overloads, or physical depreciation of 
the systems.  
Costs were a concern for all subjects interviewed, however one subject elaborated 
on the importance of keeping energy costs low. This subject explained that by lowering the 
costs of energy they could in turn charge the users on the installation less and this would 
allow them more discretionary freedom in their budget. Budgetary discretion for NAVFAC 
customers frees up funds they can allocate towards other uses in order to better perform 
their missions. This subject described a scenario in which NAVFAC was able to participate 
in economic incentive programs. The incentives of the local economic program came in 
the form of decreasing monetary costs of commercial grid electricity. On the other hand, 
violations of economic regulatory compliance often result in fines that increase costs.  
4. Minimize Casualties 
All who were interviewed felt that death and casualties were potential consequences 
of worst case scenarios. In accordance with the NAVFAC safety policy, the NAVFAC 
personnel felt that safety was a vital enabler of the support to the operational position and 
warfighter’s readiness (Naval Facilities and Engineering Command, 2013). Concerns for 
the realistic danger of working with industrial systems and the potential for casualties due 
to disruptions within control systems were expressed by all interviewed. Universally, all of 
the subjects expressed a need to maximize safety of the operating environment and the 
control system in order to minimize casualties. Deaths or casualties that occur in relation 
to control systems are contrary to the DON’s mission “to maintain, train, and equip combat-
ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom 
of the seas” (United States Navy, 2017). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2016), an average of over 150 deaths per year occurred in relation to electrical systems 
between the years of 2011 and 2015.  
B. MEANS OBJECTIVES 
The means objectives contribute to fundamental objectives. We have extracted the 
most common means objectives from the interviews and tied them to their fundamental 
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objective(s) as shown in Figure 4 above. The VFT methodology used in the interviews 
included identifying what connections were most prominent, as described in Section 
III.B.5. The following section offers brief descriptions of the means objectives, how they 
relate to NAVFAC operations, and their ties to fundamental objectives. 
1. Maximize Resilience 
As a key means objective to ensure reliability, the ability to restore power quickly 
was considered a key objective by all of those interviewed. The term resilience is used in 
several different ways. The DOE defines energy resilience as the ability to prepare, 
prevent, and recover from disruptions that impact the mission of government installations 
(DOE, 2017d). In this study, we differentiate it from other commonly used terminology 
such as “reliability.” Referencing an etymological study of the word resilience, this study 
uses the word to mean to recover from a disruption (Clark-Ginsberg, 2016), so maximizing 
resilience means minimizing the time to restore required energy services following a 
disruption.  
Three of the subjects explained that the ability of a control system to respond to a 
disruption was an integral part of the system’s use. Minimizing control system response 
time to an incident directly correlates with the resilience of the system overall. One of the 
engineers further explained that the control system could pinpoint where a disruption had 
occurred and explain what had happened. This data allowed the operator to save time and 
resources by ensuring that he brought along the correct tools and knew exactly where to 
locate the problem, and by minimizing problem solving time, the time to restore power is 
reduced. Maximizing data access, in turn, reduces problem-solving time.  
Resilience is also achieved through maximizing redundancy. The redundancy 
provided by alternative energy sources such as renewable energy, that are enabled by 
microgrids and stand-alone generators that are strategically placed to carry critical loads 
allow an installation to provide more resilient energy. The physical security of these 
redundant assets remains critical to ensure that they are ready when needed. Therefore, the 
ability to for a facility to minimize physical asset destruction directly contributes to their 
ability to maximize resilience. While one of control systems’ key features is automation, it 
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was stressed to us that the ability to shut off the system and provide manual control was 
also an integral component of a resilient system. In the case that the control system is no 
longer functioning at a desired level, the personnel expressed a need for the option to go 
off-line and perform manual controls. According to one of our subjects the ability to 
maximize manual control was an essential aspect that was needed in order to maximize 
resilience. 
2. Minimizing Labor 
As discussed in the previous means objective, the subjects explained how the 
control system automates controls and lessens the necessity for manual controls. In 
addition, modern control systems provide the ability to monitor, protect, and control 
equipment within a distributed system (Electrical Technology, 2015). Benefits of this 
technology lessen the time required for maintenance and include the replacement of manual 
labor and manpower (Weinberger, 2010). The automated functions that modern control 
systems feature minimize maintenance required on the systems. Less manpower is required 
to perform maintenance and the system provides data that help operators determine optimal 
times for maintenance to occur. Reductions in manpower and labor directly impact cost 
savings and were considered essential to all subjects within this study. 
3. Maximizing Regulation Compliance 
One of our subjects explained the costs and benefits of the regulatory compliance 
specific to the laws the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enacts. The DON 
develops and partakes in various environmental, energy, and climate change initiatives 
(DON, 2017). Environmentally compliant operations are stressed within these initiatives. 
Facilities are to remain compliant with all “applicable environmental regulations and 
polices” (DON, 2017). By minimizing environmental effects ensures that the NAVFAC 
facility is compliant and avoids penalties. Violations of environmental regulations lead to 
fines. In September 2016, the DON paid a fine of nearly $100,000 due to a violation of an 
EPA regulation on Joint Base Pearl Harbor. The EPA regulation that denied federal 
installations to utilize large-capacity cesspools had been violated (“Navy Pays EPA Fine,” 
2017). Violations of regulations increase costs and degrade the Navy’s mission. The 
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subject went on to discuss some of the energy sharing initiatives that could be used to 
receive cost savings. Maximizing economic incentive participation enables, NAVFAC 
facilities to lower the costs of their energy and better support the Navy’s mission. In 
addition, compliance with regulations reduces risks to life and health and therefore 
casualties. 
4. Maximize Flexibility 
As a means to providing reliable energy, the subjects discussed how the control 
system was important in its ability to meet the fluctuations in energy usage. Energy 
flexibility is the ability for a control system to maintain its distribution while experiencing 
fluctuations in the energy supply or demand (Papaefthymiou, Grave, & Dragoon, 2014). 
As the use of renewable energy sources, such as hydroelectricity and solar, increase, energy 
systems have an increased need for flexibility (Papaefthymiou et al., 2014).  
One subject interviewed discussed the trade-off of automated systems and user 
control. This subject expressed the need to enable a kill switch for an authorized person to 
turn the system over to manual controls. This subject had experienced issues when 
attempting to shut off an automated system. As a result, the system was no longer 
operational.  
All subjects discussed how redundancy was a key part of an installation’s energy 
flexibility. The continued use of strategically placed generators in order to back up critical 
loads was a common example of redundancy. The ability for a system to collect data 
quickly and then allow user access was stressed as an important aspect to minimizing 
problem-solving time. By maximizing data access, operators are able to make sound and 
timely decisions that adds to the systems overall flexibility.  
5. Minimize Cyber Vulnerability 
The subjects all admitted that vulnerabilities in control systems exist within the 
architecture of the system. However, the same level of concern over those vulnerabilities 
was not universally shared. One subject felt the 2015 Ukraine cyberattack that resulted in 
a prolonged outage was not an unrealistic scenario, but one that could potentially occur 
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against NAVFAC installations. Within this example, the subject discussed the 
vulnerabilities that exist when systems have complex networks with multiple entry points. 
By minimizing physical and network access, the system can decrease its cyber and physical 
vulnerabilities. Hacking and the potential to obtain authorized power to operate the control 
system was said to be a significant threat that should not be taken casually. 
6. Minimize Control System Complexity 
As a means objective to both the minimization of control system errors and the 
minimization of control system updates, the minimization of control system complexity 
was described as essential to decrease both unplanned and planned outages. One of the 
subjects that we interviewed expressed concern over the number of outages that occurred 
due to system updates and thought that a less-complex system would potentially avoid that 
problem. In addition to the increased number of planned outages, unplanned outages were 
described as more prevalent within more complex systems. A control system engineer 
explained that the more connections that a control system had to outside systems directly 
increased the amount of possibilities for disruptions. 
C. TRADE-OFFS 
1. Functionality versus Security 
The most commonly discussed trade-off was between the functionality of the 
system and security. The interviews showed that all subjects had similar understandings of 
the relationship between functionally and security, but there was no universal agreement 
on how it should be balanced. It was clear that variables such as billet responsibility, 
installation location/mission, and historical experience all weighed in as factors that 
ultimately resulted in differing perspectives and values. When interviewing a single control 
system engineer, the concern over the security of the system was described as someone 
else’s concern. This is in stark contrast to the perspective of another subject who was 
responsible for more than one installation. The subject responsible for multiple installations 
expressed personal beliefs that security was essential at all levels, and that without security 
the potential for widespread disaster over the supplied area was probable. Another subject 
who oversaw an installation felt that security was being implemented in a more than 
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adequate manner and that more security would potentially be a waste of resources. This 
subject felt that the ability to use the system was more critical and that resources ought to 
be allocated in a way to support the functions of the system. As for the risk of cyberattack, 
another subject explained that he was more worried about the rat that could chew through 
vital cables and explained that they had experienced an entire critical circuit go down after 
a gecko was electrocuted on a wire. Although we encountered different perspectives and 
thoughts on the importance of security, a common theme across all subjects was the need 
for balance between functionality and security. One subject said it this way: “The most 
secure system is one that doesn’t work.” 
2. User versus Automated Controls 
This trade-off was not universally discussed; however, one installation did find it 
important enough to emphasize more than once. While most of the interviews contained 
praise for control systems’ ability to automate functions, subjects at one installation 
expressed concern over a control system’s inability to be shut down and assume manual 
controls. The reason for this concern was given through the explanation of a relatively 
recent issue that had occurred with the microgrid. Once the microgrid malfunctioned, it 
would not respond and would not turn off. This resulted in damaged assets and the 
suspension of the microgrid’s use. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. WHAT DO THE RESULTS TELL US? 
NAVFAC stakeholders value customer support and ensuring that customers have 
the power to perform mission critical tasks. A varying degree of value was placed 
specifically on cyberdefense among stakeholders—some stakeholders felt that it was very 
important, while others placed less emphasis on it. Those who felt that cybersecurity was 
less important favored functionality and connectivity. They expressed the opinion that 
potential disruption due to cyberattack did not pose an immediate threat to their mission. 
However, those stakeholders who assigned less value to cybersecurity did not find it 
unimportant. For example, the end user stakeholders generally praised “Big Navy” and 
cyber-focused employees for researching ways to minimize the cyber threat. With this 
research, we found that the NAVFAC employees who felt this way generally believe that 
enough is being done at higher levels to combat cyber-related threats. These interviewees 
expressed that their specific installations had more pressing issues like manpower and 
systems’ compatibility. 
As Marine officers conducting this study, we can provide a similar example from 
our personal experiences. It is common for military personnel in the non-combat military 
occupations to perceive the threat of enemy contact as less probable compared to those 
who serve within the infantry community. Despite the Marine Corps stressing that all 
Marines must be riflemen first, there are many within non-combat military occupational 
specialties that become consumed with the immediate issues within their jobs and assume 
that the infantry will take care of the combat. The problem is not visible until the effects 
are experienced. However, the majority of those interviewed expressed that cybersecurity 
was essential to their mission and an integral component to ensure mission support. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Chapter III is based on Keeney’s value-focused thinking; however, Chapter III is 
only one of several steps to completing the decision analysis. According to Keeney, the 
means-ends network should first represent a summary of all stakeholder’s objectives 
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(Keeney, 1996; Siebert, 2013). The means-ends network for this problem is Figure 4. The 
means-ends network may inspire the stakeholders to create new alternatives or “potential 
choices to pursuing your [means] objectives,” which in turn would increase the odds of 
achieving their fundamental objectives (Siebert, 2013).  
To complete this VFT-based project, the NAVFAC participants must think of 
solutions that will drive improvements in their fundamental objectives. Using each 
objective in turn to brainstorm alternatives could result in potentially more solutions 
outside the scope of cybersecurity (Siebert & Keeney, 2015). These could be hardware, 
software, policy, or other operational changes. The DOD is currently pursuing antivirus 
and security software programs as the alternatives to “minimize network access” and 
“minimize cyber vulnerability” (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2017).  
Alternative brainstorming should not be restrictive. The stakeholders strive to 
develop as many options as possible no matter how unrealistic they may seem. Keeney 
states that stakeholders are to evaluate the alternatives with three criteria: usefulness, 
feasibility, and creativity. This step is designed to assist stakeholders in the determination 
of which best alternatives to pursue. There is a possibility that it could result in other 
alternatives aside from firewalls and software development for cyber-defense. It is possible 
that the results could promote a completely different approach to energy security. 
Keeney discusses the reactionary nature of decision problems. He defines decision 
problems as problems caused by other people, belligerents, or happenstance. For example, 
the Navy’s network has been hacked and we must react to the situation. These problems 
have already occurred. In the context of our thesis and SPAWAR’s ReCIst team’s project, 
the decision problem is caused by hackers or anyone who has obtained unauthorized access 
to naval control system networks. Fortunately, we do not have a decision problem, or at 
least an unclassified one— we have a decision opportunity. Keeney states a decision 
opportunity is proactive, or that a potential problem has been identified but has not occurred 
yet. In the context of our thesis and SPAWAR’s ReCIst team, the decision opportunity is, 
“which cyber-defense product do I buy to prevent control system infiltration by 
unauthorized users?” This is the question the SPAWAR ReCIst team is ultimately 
attempting to measure, cost out, and decide. 
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C. THE NEED TO STANDARDIZE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
There is the potential that a future project could be useful in the attempt to 
standardize performance measurement for the ends and means objectives found within this 
study. According to Gregory et al. (2012), there are three types of performance 
measurements: natural, constructed, and proxy. There are five categories for identifying 
and selecting each type of performance measurement for an objective: complete and 
concise; unambiguous; understandable; direct; and operational (Gregory et al., 2012, p.96-
97). Gregory et al. (2012) explain what each category means and clarifies how to determine 
if the proposed performance metric is satisfactory. Without standardization, performance 
measurements could incorrectly evaluate or insufficiently weigh information. For example, 
counting the number of deaths to measure the objective “minimize casualties” may be too 
vague. Questions regarding the measurement may include the following: Is there a 
consistent time frame? Are the deaths recorded per outage? Is the causality civilian or 
military? In order to maintain accuracy, several different measurements may need to be 
recorded simultaneously. Such an approach would seek to accurately determine the 
performance of the “minimize casualties” objective. A future project could focus on finding 
the metrics for the objective “minimize cyber vulnerability” and all other objectives. These 
measurements could be consolidated by the research team and given back to stakeholders 
for feedback. 
D. HOW CAN MULTI-OBJECTIVE DECISION ANALYSIS HELP? 
This thesis project was focused on qualitative modeling using VFT to identify 
control system end user values, objectives, and alternatives. Multi-objective decision 
analysis (MODA) is the quantitative means to analyze the qualitative results. As Dillon-
Merrill, Parnell, Buckshaw, Hensley, and Caswell (2008) put it, MODA is a method “for 
evaluating complex alternatives by systematically examining decisions and focusing on 
multiple, conflicting objectives” (p. 6). According to Parnell (2007), MODA is the method 
used to take VFT-qualitative data and analyze the best alternatives oriented toward 
achieving stakeholder values. MODA is specifically useful in analyzing conflicting 
objectives where a trade-off would normally occur (Parnell 2007). For example, a 
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commonly cited example throughout our interviews was the perceived trade-off between 
having uncertain cybersecurity results with above average control system network 
connectivity or having 100% cybersecurity results with no control system network 
connectivity at all. Both are extreme scenarios, unless electrical engineers can design a 
microgrid that does not need a control system and can run perfectly. The point is that 





While mission support was a universally shared fundamental objective among the 
participants in this research study, not all subjects agreed on which means objectives should 
be stressed in order to achieve it. The network hierarchy that this project has provided is a 
compilation of the commonly shared values along with a few means that were stressed by 
a subset of the participants. It is reassuring that all participants of this study did agree on 
the need for balance between functionality and security. An ROI tool that allows end users 
the ability to weigh values and enter their own values at their own specification would help 
to ensure that the tool does not rigidly support a particular set of preferences particular to 
one group of stakeholders or type of installation or mission. User specificity in preference 
trade-offs will be essential in order to best capture the variables associated with an 
installation, its control system, and the environment. Threats exist in all forms and the 
potential for disruptions caused by obscure reasons, such as geckos interrupting critical 
loads, will only be thought of by the end user. We believe that the subject matter experts 
on the ground are in the best position to make critical decisions on how to balance security. 
As universally expressed throughout this study, balance between trade-offs will remain 
key. This study concludes that the end users have the control to strike that balance between 
trades-offs, however supervision must carefully monitor whatever trade-off is decided. As 
Oscar Wilde is quoted, “Everything in moderation, including moderation” (Goodreads, 
n.d.). 
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